SUMMARY : In c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , U. S. e m p l o y e r s h a v e b e e n u n u s u a l l y h o s t i l e to u n i o n s . T h e i r labor p o l i c i e s varied f r o m o n e t i m e a n d industry to a n o t h e r , h o w e v e r , in defiance of familiar i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of A m e r i c a n " e x c e p t i o n a l i s m " . It is argued that b e f o r e W o r l d W a r I, o p e n s h o p s a n d trade a g r e e m e n t s r e p r e s e n t e d different s o l u t i o n s for c o m m o n labor p r o b l e m s . T h e t i m i n g of c h a n g e s in t e c h n o l o g y a n d industrial structure relative to u n i o n g r o w t h d e t e r m i n e d w h i c h strategy w o u l d b e m o r e attractive t o e m p l o y e r s . T h i s a r g u m e n t is d e v e l o p e d by c o m p a r i n g o n e o p e n s h o p industry ( t h e m a c h i n e trades) with its British c o u n t e r p a r t a n d , m o r e briefly, with s o m e U.S. industries w h e r e trade a g r e e m e n t s p r e v a i l e d .
National Metal Trades Association President Caldwell affirmed to conven tion delegates in 1912 a view of trade unionism widely shared by U.S. employers: "So long as American labor unions, as part of their fundamental purposes, insist upon the restriction of output, the limitation of appren tices, the minimum wage, and the closed shop, and so long as they seek to shorten the workday [and] countenance violence [. . .] just so long will they be opposed by our Association firmly and with unrelaxed vigilance".
1 In principle, "open shop" employers neither favored nor discriminated against unionists in hiring and firing; they merely insisted on negotiating solely with their own employees. In practice, managers denied unionists jobs as well as collective bargaining rights.
It is often argued that U.S. employers' hostility to labor organization was extreme in comparison to their European counterparts. Belligerant open shop practices, in turn, are frequently invoked in explaining the exceptional weakness of American unions. 2 The following article has no quarrel with these conclusions. Instead, it seeks to refine explanations for the labor policies of U.S. employers by placing those policies in their historical and comparative context. In doing so, questions will also be raised about the application of common theories of American "exceptionalism" to indus trial relations.
The specific goals of this article are, first, to show that the development of open shop policies in the U.S. during the early 20th century was closely related to a historical transformation in many American industries. Em ployers' efforts to install new machinery, dilute labor, and tighten control over production threatened the position of craftsmen. Open shop practices represented one strategy for resolving the ensuing conflicts in manage ment's favor. Second, it will be argued that the dominance of open shop principles was by no means assured at this time. The period featured considerable debate and experimentation among employers. Influential business spokesmen, notably members of the National Civic Federation, advocated a different strategy for solving conflict between labor and capi tal: union-management cooperation through formal trade agreements. Employers in a number of industries, moreover, actually adopted such schemes for varying lengths of time.
The third goal is to explain the resort to open shop strategies by mostbut not all -U.S. employers. Labor policies, it is argued, reflected under lying economic conditions in particular industries more than they repre sented any overall national character. Where changes in technology and market structure were rapid and, more importantly, occurred before the consolidation of trade unionism, employers had less to gain from collective bargaining and less to lose from anti-union activities. Union recognition and negotiation were less attractive to employers when technological changes reduced their dependence on skilled unionists; when managers could reduce competitive pressures without relying on industry-wide trade agreements; and when unions were still too weak to be useful allies in managing the workforce. The same conditions made skilled workers and their unions easier to fight. Timing made a difference. Neither the state of unions (strong or weak) stressed by Weinstein 3 nor the state of conflicts over craft controls (truce or war) emphasized by Montgomery 4 adequately explain the adoption of conciliatory as against combative policies toward unions in different industries. The relative timing and pace of changes in technology and unionization better account for why management in some industries endorsed collective bargaining while in others they enforced open shops.
These arguments are developed first and most fully through a compari son of the 1897-1898 British engineering lockout and the 1900-1901 U.S. machinists' strikes. This is an instructive case. It demonstrates the labor problems facing managers during the transition from craft production to modern manufacture -problems shared by British and American firms. It also shows that employers in both countries actively considered alternative strategies for meeting those problems. Finally, the case reveals outcomes which in the end were typical of industrial relations in each country as a whole: collective bargaining and strong unions in Britain, open shops and weak unions in the U.S. The explanations offered for outcomes in the machine trades are then applied briefly to other cases in the U.S.. It will be shown that where the relative timing of changes in technology, market structure, and unionization departed from American norms, so did employ ers' labor policies.
The use of comparisons among U.S. cases is designed to develop a more rigorous account of early industrial relations trends. Explanations for typ ical cross-national differences should also fit contrasts between industries within each country. These explanations are not offered as timeless gener alizations, however. They are tied to a specific period in the development of manufacturing techniques and to a period before open shop principles became business orthodoxy. The following account, accordingly, does not apply either to industries lacking craft traditions (such as dockyards) or to later conflicts over unionization (notably the rise of the CIO).
Greater attention to inter-industry comparisons has another, more po lemical purpose: to raise awkward questions for common theories of Amer ican "exceptionalism". Most scholarly work on the peculiarities of class formation in the United States focuses on labor's limited and short-lived commitments to independent political organization and socialist ideology. 
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however, have also been applied to industrial life. 6 For example, in explain ing the reluctance of workers to join and employers to recognize unions Lipset invokes a familiar culprit in accounts of working-class politics: American individualism. Peculiar political and religious traditions, he ar gues, made employers and workers alike eschew collectivism in industrial relations. Yet internal comparisons highlight important variations in em ployer policies and union strength within the U.S. Causal theories pitched at the national level cannot accomodate these variations.
7 One must instead root explanations for turn-of-the-century employer practices in the histo ries of particular industries. Trades, 1898 Trades, -1901 To argue that employer policies toward unions should be viewed against the backdrop of changes in the labor process is hardly novel. A familiar theme in historical studies of the American workplace emphasizes that production practices in many 19th century industries were controlled more by crafts men than by owners. At different times in different trades, the controls exercised and the privileges enjoyed by skilled men became serious obsta cles to employers' efforts to rationalize manufacturing techniques. Open shop drives represented attacks on those craft controls that blocked the exploitation of new technologies and managerial methods.
The Labor Process and Industrial Relations in the Machine
8
The open shop drive did aim to overcome craft resistance to new forms of production. Union-busting was not the only strategy for consolidating management control, however. Business and labor leaders belonging to the National Civic Federation (founded in 1900) advocated a different tact. They urged employers to recognize unions and accept collective bargaining as a way to stabilize industrial relations and encourage moderation on the part of union officials. Labor organizations would receive increased legiti macy, influence, and membership. In exchange, union leaders would re spect management rights and discipline unruly members. NCF spokesmen not only put trade agreements on the national agenda for industrial rela tions reform; they also played active roles in arranging these schemes in such industries as molding, coal mining, newspaper publishing, brewing, and garment making.
9 That open shops were not the inevitable outcome of conflicts over workshop control is also suggested by comparisons with Britain. British employers sought similar changes in shop practices as did their American counterparts and confronted no less recalcitrant craftsmen. But they often chose to recognize unions, insisting in return on trade agreements which ratified managerial goals. What led employers in the two countries and in different U.S. industries to their respective labor policies?
A good place to start in developing an answer is the machine trades. In both countries, the problems raised by industrial change and craft re strictions were clear and led to national confrontations. The initial resolu tions of these disputes also took identical forms: American as well as British employer associations negotiated industry-wide agreements under which union officials promised to respect management's need for flexibility and order at work. American employers soon abrogated their agreement and adopted the more familiar open shop principles. That they followed an apparently un-American policy even briefly, however, indicates that expla nations for the divergence in industrial relations cannot rely on the endur ing dispositions of national character.
During the late 1890s, the efforts of machine trades employers to reduce labor costs and increase output and order in their shops sharpened conflicts with machine shop craftsmen (engineers in Britain and machinists in the U.S.). New machinery and subdivided production tasks challenged crafts men's job controls and economic privileges. Wage incentive schemes threatened collective bargaining and customary standards for a fair day's work. And closer supervision and tighter control over manufacturing prac- tices attacked the autonomy and judgment which skilled men traditionally exercised and valued highly.
10
On a day-to-day basis, resistance to production rationalization presented employers with three specific problems.
1 1 First, union work rules restricted management flexibility in exploiting new technological opportunities and product markets. Members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and the International Association of Machinists (IAM) sought to enforce apprenticeship regulations, insisted that work previously done by fully qualified men continue to be so, and flatly rejected the introduction of payment by results. Second, such rules were by no means uniform. Local union lodges retained responsibility for the details and enforcement of work rules: accordingly, these differed from one district to another. Even within the same city, tactics varied with the strength and politics of individ ual shop committees and stewards. Local autonomy also had a strategic value. By concentrating union resources on single firms or cities, the IAM and ASE maximized their chances of victory and discouraged the spread of objectionable management practices. The result was to put some manu facturers at a competitive disadvantage. Third, in defending local work rules metal workers tended to walk out promptly and seek union sanction later. Employers thus faced frequent strikes on very short notice.
These were problems for unions leaders as well. The national executives of the ASE and the IAM were more interested than their constituents in trading work rules for economic and organizational consessions, and they saw their unions' finances, reputation, and constitutional authority as jeop ardized by hasty strikes and ill-considered local policies.
12
In July, 1897, British employers' efforts to combat the problems of restrictive work rules and irregular strikes culminated in a nation-wide lockout of ASE members which would eventually involve 700 firms and 47,500 workers.
1 3 The lockout's organizer, the Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF), was itself founded in response to local strikes over work rules, and employers explicitly justified the lockout on the grounds of protecting management rights. By organizing on an industry-wide basis and shifting the battle from a local to national scale, moreover, the EEF aimed to end local variations in union policies and combat the ASE's tactic of picking off employers one by one.
These goals are clear in the Terms of Agreement imposed on a prostrate union in January, 1898. In that agreement, employers claimed the right to introduce piecework and to select, train, employ, and pay workmen as they saw fit. Moreover, these were declared to be non-negotiable principles governing the operation of the engineering industry as a whole. Despite sharp disagreements among employers, however, the EEF chose not to smash the union but to use it for their own purposes. The Terms did represent a national agreement between employers and union representa tives and required strong union leadership to enforce its provisions on the rank and file. Unions were also necessary for the employers' third goal: to control strikes. The Terms included an industry-wide grievance procedure under which disputes not settled in the shop would be discussed in local and, if necessary, national conferences. Pending an outcome, there were to be no strikes. Clearly, union discipline was indispensable.
This scheme was not entirely unattractive to ASE leaders. In return for concessions on work rules, they received some contractual protections for union activists and greater authority for themselves in union-management negotiations. The grievance procedure also appeared to be a more civilized and less costly method for resolving disputes than were strikes. Beginning in March, 1900, a similar battle was fought in the U.S. Five thousand machinists in Chicago, 400 in Columbus, 300 in Paterson, and similar numbers in Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia struck for a ninehour day, union recognition, machinists only on "machinists'" work, sen iority and apprenticeship rules, and the recognition of shop committees. The strikes explicitly challenged management's unfettered control of the workplace. They reveal as well the other problems facing employers. Demands were formulated locally, varying from one strike center to an other, and IAM leaders were unable to limit the number of machinists walking out.
The newly formed National Metal Trades Association (NMTA) quickly assumed leadership on the employers' side. Their concerns were clear. Although willing to concede the nine-hour day, they refused to accept the restrictions on their authority demanded by machinists. Nor were NMTA leaders willing to settle the strikes on a purely local basis. Employer representatives declined to negotiate with the IAM's Chicago District Lodge because it "does not have a correct knowledge of conditions as they affect the industry at large . . . ." "But", the NMTA temporized, "we will recognize your national union through our national association", thus ensuring that "practically the same conditions of labor shall prevail in all the different sections." 1 6 Lastly, the NMTA sought IAM support in limiting local strike action and would not continue negotiations until union leaders demonstrated their power to call off outstanding strikes throughout the country. Such concerns were formally embodied in the Murray Hill Agreement which followed the strike. Under the Agreement, IAM leaders abandoned local demands for the closed shop, seniority rights, and shop committee recognition and pledged not to place "restrictions upon the management or production of the shop." In exchange, the NMTA promised the nine-hour day, effective in May, 1901. The Murray Hill Agreement also established a grievance procedure similar to the one in British engineering, replacing local autonomy with uniform national policies and negotiations and pro scribing strikes until the completion of central conferences. NMTA leaders invoked the prestige and industrial relations philosophy of the National Civic Federation in urging recalcitrant employers to accept the Agree ment.
1 8 Union leaders also applauded the pact. Concessions on work rules were justified by union recognition and the nine-hour day, while the dis putes procedure protected union finances. As a Machinists' Monthly Jour nal editorial put it, "If this idea -the board of arbitration -is carried out in a spirit of fairness and equity [. . .] there need never be any more strikes or lockouts, as far as the machinists are concerned." 1 9
The Murray Hill Agreement appeared to meet the needs both of employ ers desiring order and IAM leaders eager for recognition. Within a year, however, the Agreement collapsed. Efforts by the IAM to secure a pay hike to compensate for the scheduled reduction in hours failed. A nation-wide strike for the nine-hour day and corresponding wage increases followed in May, 1901. Many NMTA members were affected. Citing this breach of the Agreement, the employers' association withdrew from the pact. It seems clear, though, that the NMTA had decided to break with the Murray Hill Agreement before the strike. Employers insisted that requests for wage increases be handled according to the procedure: first at the level of the individual firm, and only later in national conference, and on a case-by-case basis. This was hardly agreeable to the IAM. More importantly, even before negotiations broke down, the NMTA's Administrative Council had instructed its members that "no further concessions should be granted to the Machinists' Union". 2 0 NMTA spokesmen justified their withdrawal from the Murray Hill Agreement on the grounds that it had not, after all, solved their problems. Machinists continued to insist on craft restrictions and to strike on short notice and contrary to constitutional procedures.
2 1 In other words, union leaders simply could not control their own members. These considerations were all the more disturbing to employers given the rapid increase in union strength under the Agreement -from 22,500 members in 1900 to 32,500 a year later. The alternative to Murray Hill was the open shop. Management control, the NMTA now claimed, demanded the exclusion of unions from the shops. The Association's 1901 Declaration of Principles asserted employers' "full discretion to designate the men we consider competent to perform the work and to determine the conditions under which that work shall be prose cuted".The EEF claimed no less authority, but it worked with the ASE to codify those powers. The NMTA preferred to ensure its ascendancy by victimizing and blacklisting unionists, employing labor spies, and contest ing union interests in state and federal courts and legislatures. 24 As for fighting strikes, while the EEF enlisted the disciplinary aid of ASE officials, the NMTA offered its full resources to besieged employers -financial aid, legal advice, and NMTA-organized strikebreakers and private guards. Such assistance was not available to members who negotiated with or made concessions to unions. 
Sources of Employer Policies
The Murray Hill Agreement did not live up to employers' expectations: IAM leaders could not prevent members from imposing craft restrictions or striking in breach of the arbitration procedure. But national officials of the ASE were perhaps even less successful in this regard, and still the EEF clung to the Terms. Why did American employers abandon the Murray Hill Agreement, while the Terms endured? The most important reasons for this divergence involve contrasts in the pace of technological change and trade union growth and differences in industrial structure. These contrasts shaped employer choices in two ways. First, they meant that American managers had less to gain from trade agreements, and less to lose from abandoning them, than their British counterparts. Second, they provided the economic base for broader industrial traditions, making open shops in the U.S. and trade agreements in Britain congenial as well as practical.
Compared to the British engineering industry, manufacturing practices in late 19th century American metal working were characterized by stan dardized output, an extensive division of labor, and the use of more automatic, special purpose machinery.
2 6 Particularly in the newer sectors devoted to consumer goods (sewing machines, firearms, bicycles), market conditions made it profitable to invest in specialized equipment capable of producing interchangeable parts on a large scale. Large batch production with semi-automatic machinery also made it possible to use workers of narrower skills (and lower pay) in place of broadly trained craftsmen. The success of this "American" system of manufacturing in new metal working industries led to its adoption, so far as possible, even in more traditional Sectors like machine tool manufacture.
How did production techniques shape employers' labor policies? The greater progress of technological change made craft restrictions (e.g., the insistence that certain jobs be performed only by skilled men) more irk some and decreased American manufacturers' reliance on skilled unionists. As a result, U.S. employers had both greater interest in attacking union controls at work and found it easier to do so -less experienced workers could be quickly trained to take the place of striking craftsmen. Many of these changes in production practices were firmly in place before the IAM (founded in 1888) was securely established. Since the I A M represented relatively few skilled men 2 7 the union was of less potential value for helping employers maintain control and manage their workforce. And the I A M ' S comparative weakness also made it easier to fight than the ASE. Union growth under the Murray Hill Agreement would only have made the contest more difficult.
Advanced production methods and weak unions in the U.S. thus mini mized the attractions of trade agreements as a means for consolidating management authority and avoiding disruption. Collective bargaining still might have been useful for standardizing labor costs and limiting competi tion. This was a less pressing concern in the U.S., however. With capital more concentrated and firms more specialized in narrow product lines (few machine tool manufacturers, for example, competed in any one line), American employers had less need for unions to moderate competitive inequalities among shops and cities. Again, timing was crucial. Even had U.S. employers sought to further stabilize wages and working conditions, they could not rely on the IAM to achieve this goal. Machinists remained sparsely organized, and conciliatory employers would have confronted firms which still enjoyed the benefits of open shops. Members of the EEF, by contrast, had a greater interest in limiting competition, and, because skilled workers were more widely organized, employers also had in unions an effective means with which to pursue that interest. These differences were of long standing and supported contrasting indus trial relations traditions that influenced employer choices during the crises of 1897-8 and 1900-1. During the second half of the 19th century, British engineering experienced a slow but steady growth in its exports of heavy machinery whose manufacture required skilled men. Export demand could be met through an expansion of employment within the technical status quo, avoiding confrontations over established work practices. British engineering thus enjoyed a tradition of collective bargaining which extended back over forty years. When new technological opportunities intensified conflict in the 1890s and led to the nation-wide lockout of 1897, most employers saw the dispute as an opportunity to force union compli ance with management needs rather than as a chance to smash the union. Sustained economic growth in the industry after 1898 enabled employers to accept the failings of the Terms of Agreement and made a general confron tation with craft unions unattractive.
The timing of technological change and union development had different consequences in the U.S. machine trades. Economic growth during the 1870s and 1880s was rapid, it was led by the development of new product markets, and it occurred amid a scarcity of skilled labor. Employers respon ded with labor-saving technologies and shop reorganization rather than expanding the scope of traditional manufacturing practices.
30 By the time the IAM began pressing for agreements on work rules and wage rates, the strategic position of skilled men at work had already eroded. In this con text, union recognition and collective bargaining seemed to endanger both employers' right to manage and the success of their businesses. Moreover, quite different industrial relations practices had become customary, espe cially in the northeast where machinists were most weakly organized and production methods most progressive. Here employers negotiated pay and working conditions with their own employees, if possible on an individual basis. No legacy of collective bargaining existed to sustain the Murray Hill Agreement in the face of widespread disputes over wages in 1901. This explanation for why U.S. employers rejected trade agreements also ac counts for why they briefly embraced them. The storm center of the 1900 dispute was Chicago, the one American city which could rival Britain for strong union organization and a history of collective bargaining. Here employer support for trade agreements made sense, and indeed collective bargaining survived in Chicago even after the demise of Murray Hill. 
Evidence from Internal Comparisons
This account of industrial relations in the machine trades may be more widely applicable. In a broad range of American industries, the shift from craft production to modern manufacture began before the emergence of stable trade unionism in the late 1800s. In Britain, by contrast, craft unions established themselves in numerous trades during the third quarter of the 19th century; technological and managerial challenges to craft control at work occurred more slowly and came later. ences between British and American industrial relations are the product of distinctive national cultures, political histories, or ethnic compositions rather than contrasts in the timing of industrial change? Internal compari sons suggest not. Where conditions in the U.S. departed from national norms, so did industrial relations.
The machine trades themselves provide one example. The bespoke character of American railroad repair shop work made employers in this sector far more dependent on skilled labor than their counterparts else where in the industry. And here not only were labor policies more concilia tory and unions stronger; in addition, employers pursued strategies typical of British engineering. Railroad management preferred to deal with union leaders rather than with shop-floor representatives, and agreements with unions typically provided for the arbitration of local disputes by national officials. 33 In England, Coventry's local economy at the end of the century was dominated by newer products associated with more advanced manu facturing techniques -bicycles and automobiles. These industries had developed in the absence of local traditions of engineering trade union ism.
3 4 Such "American" conditions had, by British standards, "American" consequences: managers resisted collective bargaining and frequently victimized union activists. Unions gained strength and recognition after 1907, when most major local employers joined the Engineering Employers' Federation and began to follow its labor policies. Yet in the 1920s, a nation-wide counteroffensive against workplace unionism was pursued with special enthusiasm and exceptional success in Coventry. Other departures from "typical" patterns of industrial relations in the U.S. also correspond to atypical economic circumstances. In both printing and construction, localized and variable product markets made large-batch production techniques inappropriate. Continued reliance on skilled labor and the resulting opportunity for craft unions to establish themselves raised the costs of open shop policies. Employers instead accepted collective bargaining and even relied on union representatives for help in hiring and workplace discipline -policies which, in turn, favored further union growth.
3 6 The International Typographical Union, for example, had se cured recognition from most newspaper printing employers by the late 19th American building and construction workers enjoyed a level of organ ization (55%) far higher than their British counterparts' (24%).
1
Finally, where labor costs were high and competition intense some American employers turned to trade agreements to standardize wages and minimize work stoppages -even where the labor process did not make skill decisive. The coal industry is a leading example. When the introduction of mechanical coal mining began in the 1890s, the United Mine Workers enrolled relatively few coal miners (33,000 in 1898). Beginning in 1897, however, UMW strikes persuaded bituminous (soft) coal operators to collaborate with the union. As their reward for recognizing the union and negotiating interstate pay standards, mining companies removed wages from competition and won no-strike clauses to keep miners at work. By 1904, the UMW had over 260,000 members, a rate of growth and a union density far exceeding that of the AFL as a whole.
2
Conclusions
This examination of industrial relations in the British and American ma chine trades emphasized how the pace of changes in technology, union growth, and market structure shaped employers' policies. The focus was on management strategies, but the argument has implications for labor or ganization as well.
The connections between employer policies and unionization are both direct and indirect. The ability of unions to gain members and recognition will be impaired if managers threaten to fire unionists, refuse to bargain with union representatives, and replace striking union members. This is not surprising; neither is it decisive. Employer opposition may be overcome under favorable economic or political conditions, as evidenced by the success of Britain's New Unions after 1910, and the CIO in the late 1930s. On the other hand, while U.S. employees initially may have been less interested in joining unions, more workers tried to organize than succeeded in doing so. Surely some part of their failure came from fear of the conse quences -dismissal, blacklisting -which businesses imposed. Less hostile employer policies would have made a difference.
Indirectly, some of the same factors which favored open shop strategies also weakened early labor organizing in the U.S. The stable core of the late The anthracite (hard coal) fields were dominated by small numbers of large corporate owners. Competitive pressures were less intense and the virtues of trade agreements less obvious for these employers than they were for operators in bituminous coal. The U M W did win recognition and collective bargaining agreements in the anthracite sector, but their successes before W W I were m o r e limited and c a m e later than in soft coal. S e e Ramirez, When Workers Fight, chs 1-2; and G r e e n , The World of the Worker, pp. 50-56.
